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Abstract We examine the determinants of events of default clauses in syndicated
loan and bond contracts, provisions that allow lenders to request the repayment of
principal and to terminate lending commitments. We document significant variation
in the use of default clauses and their restrictiveness within the same type of lending
contract but also across loans and bonds. We find that default clauses in public bond
contracts are less restrictive than those in syndicated loan contracts. We also docu-
ment that two ex ante proxies for bankruptcy costs, the level of intangible assets and
capitalized research and development expenditures at the time of debt contracting, are
associated with less restrictive default clauses, especially in bond contracts. We
conclude that bondholders attempt to mitigate the occurrence of inefficient defaults.
Given their inability to coordinate with each other and their ownership of subordi-
nated claims, bondholders incur higher default costs than bank lenders.
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1 Introduction
The incomplete contracting theory emphasizes the efficient allocation of control
rights in debt contracting relationships in the presence of unforeseeable contingen-
cies and agency conflicts between shareholders and debtholders. Debtholders are
granted control rights in a state-contingent manner when borrowers miss debt
payments (Hart and Moore 1988) or financially underperform (e.g., Aghion and
Bolton 1992; Dewatripont and Tirole 1994). The conditions allowing these control
rights to be transferred to lenders are usually described in provisions in debt
contracts, which are generally termed ‘‘events of default’’ clauses. Although these
clauses are critical in facilitating the enforcement of lenders’ rights, very little is
known about their specification and the role they play in debt contracting. In this
paper, we use a large sample of bond and syndicated loan contracts and provide
evidence on the characteristics of default clauses in debt contracts as well as the
economic factors that determine these characteristics.
If the majority of lenders in a debt contract agree that an event of default has
occurred, control rights over the borrower are effectively transferred to debtholders.
A default arises when an event specified in the default clauses (e.g., a missed
payment, a bankruptcy filing, a covenant breach, etc.) takes place and, in many
instances, when such an event reaches a certain financial threshold or lasts beyond a
predetermined grace period. The financial threshold triggers and grace periods that
characterize the events of default introduce a materiality test into the definition of
default and a time limit for the borrower to cure the default, respectively. The
presence of these features indicates that lenders strive to limit instances when a
suboptimal event of default is triggered as a default generates significant costs that
outweigh the benefits. For instance, triggering an event of default when a borrower
is financially healthy is costly for lenders because it does not add additional
monitoring benefits and negatively impacts the borrower’s operations. Declaring
that a healthy borrower is in default can adversely impact the borrower’s ability to
obtain additional and cheaper debt to finance new investments and incentivizes
others to avoid business transactions with the borrower.
We hypothesize that lenders will set less restrictive default clauses if they expect
high costs when events of default are triggered. These costs are larger when the
borrower needs to recontract the debt via an in-court restructuring instead of privately
negotiatingwith lenders. In-court restructurings aremore likelywhen there are serious
coordination and holdout problems among creditors due to their dispersion or
conflicting incentives (e.g., Asquith et al. 1994; Bolton and Scharfstein 1996; Bris and
Welch 2005;Gilson 1997). In addition, the costs incurred by a particular lenderwhen a
default clause is triggered increase if the lender’s claim is junior to other debtholder
claims, the borrower enters into a corporate reorganization (or even liquidation), or the
borrower’s assets in place have low liquidation values. We test our hypothesis using a
large sample of 4627 bond prospectuses and 9361 syndicated loan contracts issued by
public firms in the United States from 1996 through 2009.
We read the events of default section in each bond or loan contract and manually
code all types of default clauses, along with their terms (i.e., financial threshold
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triggers and grace periods). We start by documenting significant variation in these
clauses and their characteristics consistent with the interpretation that lenders
consider the consequences of default clauses on the value of their claims when they
design debt contracts. We identify four events of default that are present in all bond
and loan contracts: (1) the declaration of insolvency, bankruptcy, or reorganization;
(2) the failure to pay the debt principal; (3) the failure to pay interest on the
outstanding debt; and (4) the violation of a covenant.1 Other common events of
default specified in debt contracts are cross-acceleration or cross-default (52 % of
bond contracts have cross-acceleration clauses and 95 % of loan contracts have
cross-default clauses),2 the failure to pay court judgments above certain thresholds
(10 % of bond contracts and 92 % of loan contracts), and the existence of
guarantees that become invalid (8 % of bond contracts and 28 % of loan contracts).
Some events of default are unique to loan contracts, such as Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) events (95 % of loan contracts),3 changes of
control ownership (71 % of loan contracts), and the existence of pending litigation
(2 % of loan contracts). Bond-specific events of default clauses mainly relate to
particular bond features. The most common are the failure to make payments to
sinking funds (62 % of bond contracts) and the failure to redeem the bond principal
when bondholders exercise their redemption rights (41 % of bond contracts).
We capture the overall restrictiveness of the set of default clauses with two
measures: (1) a default clause index that takes into account all clauses and the
relative restrictiveness of their terms and (2) the total number of clauses in the
contract. Using these measures, we provide evidence consistent with the hypothesis
that default clauses in debt contracts are less restrictive if the costs of triggering
events of default are high for lenders. First, we assess differences in the
restrictiveness of default clauses across bonds and syndicated loans. We expect
that bondholders incur higher event of default costs relative to bank syndicates for
several reasons. Bondholders face more serious coordination and free-riding
problems due to their dispersed bond ownership, which limits their ability to
negotiate favorable outcomes with borrowers and other lenders. Also, some bonds
that trade in the secondary market are acquired by hedge funds and other distressed
investors, who have different incentives from other bondholders when borrowers are
in distress. These investors often induce holdout problems that increase default costs
(e.g., Hotchkiss and Mooradian 1997; Ivashina et al. 2013; Jiang et al. 2012).
Finally, bondholders’ claims are subordinated to those of senior and secured bank
syndicates. As a result, bondholders have significantly lower loan recovery rates
1 Although these clauses seem to be standard, their grace periods vary significantly. For instance, the
grace period for missed interest payments ranges from 0 to 90 days, depending on the type of lending
contract.
2 We use the term cross-default to describe both cross-default and cross-acceleration clauses. Wight et al.
(2009) point out differences between these two provisions. Cross-default allows the credit agreement to
be accelerated whenever a default or an event of default occurs on another instrument, whether or not the
debt under that instrument has been or may be accelerated. Cross-acceleration allows the credit agreement
to be accelerated only when the other debt has been accelerated.
3 To the extent that a company pays retired employees a defined pension benefit, the company is required
under ERISA to pay into a trust an amount sufficient to cover its future benefit obligations. ERISA events
are situations in which a firm fails to meet its pension funding obligations.
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than banks (e.g., Grossman et al. 1997). Consistent with our hypothesis, we
document that default clauses are significantly less restrictive in bond contracts than
in syndicated loan contracts. The restrictiveness of the default clauses in bond
contracts based on our indices is lower by approximately 30 % than the
restrictiveness in loan contracts. This result is consistently robust in both univariate
and multivariate tests including within-firm analyses.
Second, we focus on bond contracts and investigate whether the restrictiveness of
default clauses varies with costs that bondholders expect to incur if a borrower goes
through a corporate reorganization (a filing under Chapter 11) or liquidation (a filing
under Chapter 7). We measure the expected costs of restructurings under Chapters 11
or 7 with three proxies: (1) the level of investments in intangible assets, (2) the level of
capitalized research and development (R&D) expenditures, and (3) the amount of
senior debt outstanding. Bankruptcy costs are expected to be higher when firms have
more intangibles because these firm-specific assets increase risk shifting and have low
liquidation value (e.g., Rajan and Zingales 1995).4 Moreover, bondholders are
typically junior claimants who are less likely to recover their investments in
bankruptcy when there is more senior debt outstanding. Our results indicate that
default clauses in bond contracts are significantly less restrictive if borrowers have high
levels of intangible assets, capitalized R&D expenditures, and syndicated loans
outstanding, suggesting that bondholders aim to avoid low recovery rates due to forced
sales of illiquid intangible assets. For instance, a one standard deviation increase in the
level of investments in intangible assets (the amount of senior debt outstanding)
decreases the default clause index by 14 % (18 %) of its standard deviation.
We further test whether inter-creditor coordination costs, proxied by the presence of
more senior claims relative to junior claims (the ratio of the total amount of loans
outstanding to the amount of bond issued), exacerbate the impact of expected bankruptcy
costs on the restrictiveness of bond default clauses. We find that, when there are more
senior debt claims, the negative relationship between the level of intangible assets and
the bond default clause restrictiveness is stronger. These cross-sectional results indicate
that bondholders prefer less restrictive default clauses to avoid pushing borrowers into
bankruptcy when the coordination costs with other creditors are likely to be higher.
In a final set of tests, we provide evidence on the different impact of bankruptcy
costs on the default clause restrictiveness specified in bond and loan contracts. We
predict that the expected bankruptcy costs that could be triggered by the declaration
of an event of default will have a greater negative impact on the restrictiveness of
bond default clauses than on that of loan default clauses. This is because senior bank
lenders typically obtain strong control rights in bankruptcy to protect their claims
(e.g., Ayotte and Morrison 2009; McGlaun 2007).5 Also, an event of default in a
4 Consistent with this argument, Gilson et al. (1990) document that lenders prefer to avoid in-court
corporate reorganizations if the borrower has a large fraction of intangible assets.
5 Ayotte and Morrison (2009) document that senior bank creditors’ exercise substantial control over
bankrupt firms by adding strict terms to additional financing they provide in bankruptcy through debtor-
in-possession loans. These terms include liens on all the firm’s assets, restrictions on the use of cash while
operating in bankruptcy, the imposition of specific budgets, requirements of detailed reports on cash
receipts and expenditures, and so on. Dahiya et al. (2003) find that a majority of the firms that file for
Chapter 11 obtain debtor-in-possession financing from senior banks that provided debt before the filing.
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loan contract is less likely to lead to costly firm reorganizations or liquidations due
to banks’ abilities to renegotiate their loans at low cost (e.g., Roberts 2014). We
document that the restrictiveness of default clauses in bond contracts is more
negatively associated with the level of intangible assets reported by borrowers,
relative to loan contracts. While the borrower’s level of investments in intangible
assets significantly decreases the restrictiveness of loan default clauses, the
economic magnitude of the effect is less than half of that for bond contracts and the
difference is statistically significant. Also, the amount of capitalized R&D
expenditure is not associated with the restrictiveness of loan default clauses but is
negatively associated with the clause restrictiveness in bond contracts. These results
are robust to a propensity score matching methodology where we match borrowers
issuing bonds and loans based on their fundamentals and credit risk. Our evidence
indicates that bondholders demand less restrictive default clauses when expected
liquidation costs are high to limit instances of default, consistent with their more
passive role in bankruptcy and the fact that their claims are more likely to be
covered by low value and illiquid intangible assets. In contrast, while senior and
secured bank lenders demand more restrictive default clauses, these clauses are not
a function of liquidation costs given that banks can exercise significant control over
the borrower’s activities in bankruptcy.
Our study makes several contributions. First, we contribute to the debt
contracting literature by providing new and comprehensive evidence on the
structure of default clauses in both bond and loan contracts. We document
significant variation in the types of default clauses and their characteristics,
suggesting that these ubiquitous provisions play a critical role in debt contracting.
We also show that lenders require default clauses that minimize costs associated
with defaults. While Beatty et al. (2012) examine a particular event-of-default
clause in only one set of debt contracts (i.e., the cross-acceleration clause in bond
contracts), we view the evidence in the literature on the determinants and role of
default clauses in debt contracts as very limited.6 Our study is also relevant to the
incomplete debt-contracting theory which has investigated the allocation of control
rights to creditors (e.g., Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1988), as default
clauses are the only debt contract provision that allows the transfer of control rights
from the borrower to its lenders.
Second, we add to the extensive literature on the drivers and role of covenants in
debt contracts (e.g., Billett et al. 2004; Bradley and Roberts 2004; Christensen and
Nikolaev 2012; Nash et al. 2003; Nini et al. 2009). We document that default
clauses cover a wide set of events that trigger the transfer of control rights to
lenders, not just covenant breaches. In addition, we show that these clauses reflect
inter-creditor conflicts that appear when borrowers land in financial trouble. Except
for few clauses that are debt security specific, most clauses are common across bond
and loan contracts. This significant overlap ensures comparability across different
types of debt contracts and allows us to contrast the control rights allocation
6 Our paper complements Beatty et al. (2012) by providing unique insights on the determinants of the full
set of default clauses and their characteristics (grace periods and financial threshold triggers) and by
explaining differences between bond and loan contracts. We find that our bond sample results are not
fully driven by the cross-acceleration provision.
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preferences of lenders with different incentives, monitoring capabilities, and
information access (i.e., syndicate banks and bond investors). In contrast, covenant
specifications across loan and bond contracts are diverse and not comparable given
that they are based on lenders’ monitoring capabilities and information access.7
In Sect. 2, we provide the institutional background and develop our hypotheses.
We describe the data and provide descriptive evidence in Sect. 3. In Sect. 4, we
compare the default clause restrictiveness in bond and loan contracts. In Sect. 5, we
discuss the multivariate analyses of the cross-sectional variation of default clause
restrictiveness. We conclude in Sect. 6.
2 Institutional background and hypotheses development
Historically, when firms are solvent, a firm’s management owes fiduciary duties to
shareholders, not debtholders. However, when firms become insolvent or are
approaching insolvency, management owes fiduciary duties to the firm’s debthold-
ers too (e.g., Becker and Stromberg 2012; Branch 2000). As a result, to protect their
interests, debt holders stipulate provisions with their rights in the debt contracts.
We focus on one set of these provisions, the so-called events of default clauses,
whose main role is to facilitate the transfer of control rights to lenders when there
are signs that the borrower may default. The events of default specify circumstances
associated with financial troubles, such as the failure to pay interest and debt
principal, covenant violations, presence of invalid guarantees, among others. These
clauses provide lenders with the legal means to demand the immediate repayment of
their claims’ face value, to stop extending credit to the borrower (especially in the
case of revolving bank loans), or to exercise remedies against the borrower.
One remedy option available to lenders when a default occurs is an out-of-court
restructuring whereby they voluntarily exchange their debt securities or restate the
terms of these securities. This resolution is the fastest and the least costly for both
lenders and borrowers. Thus it is not surprising that about 75 % of defaulting firms
choose such a path (e.g., Emery and Cantor 2005). An alternative is a corporate
reorganization via a traditional or pre-packaged bankruptcy filing under Chapter 11.8
Most firms entering Chapter 11 do so only after attempting to resolve their financial
difficulties out of court, as a court resolution can be quite costly. For instance,
Franks and Torous (1994) find that lenders’ average recovery rates are about eighty
cents on one dollar of creditor claims for distressed exchanges of debt securities out
of court and substantially lower at fifty-one cents on one dollar in Chapter 11
reorganizations. A final option, when the firm’s stakeholders cannot agree on
reorganization, is Chapter 7 bankruptcy, which provides for the orderly liquidation
7 For instance, bank lending agreements rely on financial covenants to monitor the performance of a
borrower, while bond contracts require mainly event-driven covenants (e.g., asset sales, M&As or
additional borrowing restrictions).
8 In a traditional Chapter 11 case, the debtor files a bankruptcy petition with the court. Under US
bankruptcy codes, the debtor then has the exclusive right to propose a plan of reorganization within
120 days following the filing date. With a prepackaged filing, the bankruptcy petition and the plan of
reorganization are filed concurrently.
Default clauses in debt contracts 1601
123
of a firm’s assets, with debtholders receiving payments generally in the order of
their seniority. This option is the most costly to debtholders, as their recovery rates
are significantly lower than in Chapter 11 (e.g., Bris et al. 2006).
While the presence of more restrictive default clauses provides benefits to
debtholders by potentially facilitating the timely transfer of control rights when
borrowers underperform, creditors can incur significant costs when events of default
are triggered. We hypothesize that these costs are an important determinant of the
restrictiveness of default clauses.
The costs associated with default clauses arise for several reasons. First, the
presence of potentially serious coordination problems among creditors is likely to
increase the cost of an event of default because the borrowing firm is more likely to
file for Chapters 7 or 11 when creditors disagree. In the presence of multiple classes
of debt holders, strict default clauses elicit defaults that result in inefficiencies, as
different types of lenders often fail to coordinate renegotiations and to agree on
reorganization plans. For instance, Bris and Welch (2005) posit that lenders fail to
coordinate efficiently when they are dispersed and that a group of concentrated
creditors obtains a higher recovery rate than a large group of uncoordinated
creditors. A concentrated set of creditors has more bargaining power when dealing
with a distressed borrower because they do not face mutual free-riding incentives.
Also, Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) suggest that, from an ex ante perspective, the
liquidation value of a firm is lower when there are multiple creditors and the firm is
credit risky. Second, conditional on a firm going into corporate reorganization or
liquidation, the cost of an event of default to lenders is higher if the firm’s assets in
place have low market value. Lenders incur higher liquidation costs if the assets are
firm-specific and illiquid as these assets can only be sold at prices below their value
in best use (e.g., Gilson et al. 1990; Rajan and Zingales 1995). Third, an event of
default triggers larger losses for unsecured and junior creditors, who are paid only
after senior and secured creditors receive in full the face value of their claims, along
with the associated accrued interest.9
In our setting, we expect that, relative to syndicated bank lenders, bondholders
face higher losses when an event of default occurs. One reason is that bondholders
do not coordinate with each other efficiently when a borrower defaults as the
diffused bond ownership gives some bondholders free-riding incentives.10 Coordi-
nation problems are exacerbated by the fact that (1) the identity of individual
bondholders changes regularly due to bond trading in the secondary market, (2)
there are conflicting incentives and holdout problems when opportunistic bond
investors have hedged against default while others have not or have a strategy of
pushing the company into bankruptcy to take it over (e.g., distressed fund investors),
9 In addition, unsecured creditors suffer further losses because the strict priority of claims rule is violated
in reorganization. These claimants often receive lower recovery rates because they accept compensation
for even more junior creditors and equityholders to induce them to accept a reorganization plan sooner.
See Weiss (1990) for empirical evidence.
10 The models of Bergman and Callen (1991) and Rajan (1992) provide support for this argument. They
show that an increase in the number of lenders lowers the probability that a single lender is pivotal in
renegotiation. In particular, small lenders have an incentive to free ride, thereby increasing the
inefficiencies in liquidity defaults.
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and (3) bondholders face significant information asymmetries given their limited
access to firm-specific information. In contrast, banks have concentrated ownership
with respect to the syndicated loans they issue, allowing for better coordination and
lower renegotiation costs.11 Banks also have a comparative cost advantage in
monitoring borrowers and gaining superior access to private information (Campbell
and Kracaw 1980; Diamond 1984; Fama 1985; Ramakrishnan and Thakor 1984).
These factors contribute to better decisions and stronger negotiation abilities in
defaults, which decrease the costs of a default.
Another reason why bondholders are worse off than bank lenders is because
bondholders’ claims are subordinate to banks’ claims. Not only do bank lenders
receive payments ahead of bondholders in liquidation, but they can close lines of
credit, suspend the processing of borrower’s payments, or obtain substantial control
rights in bankruptcy (e.g., Ayotte and Morrison 2009), thus further contributing to a
drop in the residual value left to bondholders.12 Thus we expect bondholders’ losses
to be larger when there are more senior bank lenders with outstanding claims.
Bondholders’ losses in default are also exacerbated if the borrower relies to a greater
extent on highly illiquid firm-specific assets (e.g., intangibles). These assets are
more likely to be used to cover bondholders’ junior claims, given that bank lenders
receive mainly tangible assets as collateral. Consistent with these arguments,
Grossman et al. (1997) find that syndicated loan recovery rates, measured just after
borrowers emerge from distress, are 82 % (absolute value), while the recovery on
subordinated bonds of the same issuers is much lower, at around 40 %.13
In sum, the arguments above indicate that lenders balance the costs and benefits
associated with default clauses in debt contracts. In particular, to mitigate potential
losses on their investments in case of default, bondholders might prefer to require
less restrictive default clauses than bank syndicates, especially when liquidation
costs are high (i.e., large senior claims are present or a firm’s assets in place have
low liquidation values). Less restrictive clauses lower the probability of default and
allow bondholders to avoid the costs associated with default.14 However, this
outcome is not straightforward. Relative to senior lenders who can expropriate their
wealth, bondholders have an inferior status in liquidation negotiations and face
11 Gilson et al. (1990) study the restructuring of 169 financially distressed US companies. They find that
companies are more likely to be successfully restructured when the number of lenders is small and the
share of bank debt is high. More recently, Ivashina et al. (2013) find that distressed borrowers with a more
concentrated set of creditors go through Chapter 11 restructuring faster and have a lower likelihood of
liquidation.
12 Banks often obtain super-seniority in bankruptcy proceedings by providing debtor-in-possession loans
to the firm. These loans are typically short-term revolving lines of credit that enable a financially
distressed firm to restructure its financial and operational base.
13 In liquidations, lenders bear additional costs such as the costs associated with investigating the
borrower’s true financial resources, filing claims with the borrower or its liquidator, hiring legal advisors,
following up through an insolvency process, communicating and negotiating with the borrower, loss of
tax credits that the firm would have received had it not gone bankrupt, etc. All these costs are paid before
debtholders’ claims are covered, further contributing to the lower recovery rate of junior bondholders.
14 We note that in return for less restrictive default clauses, bondholders could obtain other contractual
terms that are more favorable, such as higher yields. An analysis of the tradeoff between the
restrictiveness of default clauses and offering bond yields is beyond the scope of our paper.
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greater information asymmetry. Thus bondholders might obtain benefits that
outstrip the costs if they receive control rights earlier. In this situation, they might
prefer default clauses that are as restrictive, if not more restrictive, than the default
clauses in syndicated loan contracts.
3 Sample selection and descriptive statistics on events of default clauses
3.1 Sample selection
To construct the bond sample, we begin with regulatory filings that contain bond
prospectuses or prospectus supplements for the 1996–2009 period.15 Under the
Securities Act of 1933, firms must disclose significant information about securities
offered for public sale via filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). Since the majority of bond prospectuses and prospectus supplements are
filed with the SEC in Forms S-3 and 424, we start by retrieving these forms, as well
as other SEC filings that may contain prospectuses. We are guided by the types of
SEC forms mentioned in the Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD).16
We use a text-search software program to scan all SEC filings downloaded for the
keywords ‘‘event(s) of default’’ and ‘‘indenture.’’ This allows us to remove filings
that include information from equity prospectuses.
Next, we match the identified SEC filings with the FISD and Compustat
databases based on central index key (CIK) numbers and filing dates. We first
manually match the FISD and Compustat databases using issuers’ CUSIPs, names,
and industries. We then match the merged FISD-Compustat sample with the SEC
filings that contain bond prospectuses and prospectus supplements using as
matching fields the CIKs and filing dates. We exclude filings on bonds issued by
financial institutions and non-US corporate borrowers, as well as privately placed
bonds. We manually confirm the accuracy of the remaining documents and code the
default clauses. (We discuss the coding below.) Our final bond sample consists of
4627 bonds issued by 865 nonfinancial firms in the US.
We also obtain a comprehensive sample of syndicated loan contracts. We start
with 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K SEC filings for 1996–2009, as material debt agreements
are typically disclosed in these forms. We extract SEC filings that include loan
agreements using the keywords ‘‘event(s) of default’’ and ‘‘credit agreement,’’ ‘‘loan
agreement,’’ or ‘‘credit facility.’’ We then manually map the extracted filings to the
DealScan and Compustat databases using loan origination dates, loan amounts, and
borrower names. Following this matching, we obtain 9361 loan contracts issued by
4033 nonfinancial firms in the US.
15 We start with the year 1996 because before 1995, electronic filings are not available on a large scale in
EDGAR, the SEC’s electronic filing system.
16 FISD identifies 82 types of SEC forms from which it collects bond-specific data.
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3.2 The coding of events of default
All events that trigger the declaration of default are described in the default clause
section of the debt contract with the exception of covenant terms. Although the
violation of a covenant is an event of default in all debt contracts, the types of
covenants required and their characteristics are covered in a separate covenant
section. We start by coding the default clauses using pilot samples of 100 bond
contracts and 100 loan contracts. This approach allows us to identify common
events of default that are required by lenders in debt contracts, as well as their most
important characteristics. Events of default that do not appear in the pilot sample are
classified as ‘‘other clauses.’’ A total of 82.5 % (3.6 %) of the loan (bond) contracts
contain other default clauses.
The terms of an event of default clause are a matter of contract. There are
standard specifications of events of default that appear in most debt contracts but
also events that are tailored to better suit individual borrowers. In ‘‘Appendix 1’’, we
provide a list with the main events of default and a complete description of each
event, as well as examples of infrequent default clauses that we code as ‘‘other
clauses.’’ Table 1 reports descriptive evidence on default clauses in bond and loan
contracts. In Panel A, we present the frequencies of nine events of default that are
common to both bond and loan contracts: bankruptcy filings (100 % in bonds and
loans), principal payment defaults (100 % in bonds and loans),17 interest payment
defaults (100 % in bonds and loans), covenant breaches (100 % in bonds and loans),
cross-default clause (52 % in bonds and 95 % in loans), court order clauses (10 %
in bonds and 92 % in loans),18 invalid guarantees (8 % in bonds and 28 % in loans),
defaults on nondebt liabilities (1 % in bonds and 0.1 % in loans), and failures to
report the occurrence of a fundamental change (0.2 % in bonds and 0.1 % in
loans).19
The cross-default clause in bond contracts typically takes the form of cross-
acceleration (i.e., bondholders can accelerate the payment of their debt only if other
lenders accelerate their debt).20 This is potentially less restrictive than a regular
cross-default, which is more common in syndicated loan contracts (i.e., banks can
accelerate their debt if the borrower has defaulted on other debt contracts, regardless
17 In the case of syndicated loans, the clause on missed principal payments has relevance when a loan is
amortizing (i.e., payable in installments) or the loan agreement provides for mandatory partial
prepayments.
18 Although this clause is not common in bond contracts, it can have significant consequences. For
example, in 1984, Texaco faced an $11 billion judgment for allegedly interfering with Pennzoil’s
acquisition of Getty Oil. Because the lawsuit could contribute to a breach in debt agreements, Texaco was
forced to file for bankruptcy to gain the benefit of the bankruptcy code’s automatic stay and thereby gain
the time it needed to appeal.
19 A fundamental change may involve a merger, an acquisition, a sale-and-leaseback transaction, or the
delisting of the company’s stock (see ‘‘Appendix 1’’ for more details). Also, another clause that triggers
default is material misrepresentations. We do not report this clause because it is mentioned in all loan
agreements and is implicitly required in all bond agreements according to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.
20 See Beatty et al. (2012) for a detailed investigation of the determinants of cross-acceleration clauses in
bond contracts.
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of whether those lenders accelerate their debt). We combine the cross-acceleration
and cross-default clauses since they both require early repayment of the debt
conditional on events concerning other debt securities. Both clauses can
significantly affect a borrower’s ability to repay the lenders and may trigger
foreclosure on collateral (if the other creditors are secured) or even a bankruptcy
filing (e.g., Wight et al. 2009). The cross-default to other debt is probably one of the
most serious events-of-default clauses, as it may have an unintended domino effect
that could seriously weaken the borrower’s financial position. We find that cross-
default clauses are included in about half of the bond contracts (52 %) and in almost
all loan contracts (95 %).
In Panel A of Table 1, we also present events of default that are unique to bond
contracts, including the failure to make installment payments into sinking funds
(62 %), the failure to meet redemption requirements (41 %), and the failure to
deliver the settlement amount on the conversion of bonds into equity when
bondholders exercise their conversion rights (1 %). These clauses originate from
bond-specific characteristics such as the presence of sinking fund provisions or
convertibility/redemption options. Event of default clauses unique to loan contracts
include the failure to meet ERISA funding obligations (95 %), the occurrence of a
change in control with respect to the equity shares of the borrower (71 %), and the
presence of pending litigation (1.9 %).21 The change in control event is an example
of an event of default that is not within the borrower’s control, as the borrower
cannot determine the shareholders’ sale of the stock.
Certain default clauses state that the event of default can be remedied within a
certain grace period. Thus default will occur only if the event of default continues
beyond the grace period. The longer the grace period, the more time a borrower has
to remedy the issue, thus making the default clause less restrictive. Panel B of
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the grace periods of various default
clauses. We find that grace periods range from 0 to 120 days, depending on the
nature of the default clause and the debt claim. The principal payment clause has a
very short grace period: the average grace period is about half a day for both bonds
and loans. Such a short period is stipulated to prevent missed payments due to wire
transfer difficulties or administrative errors. The court order clause, on the other
hand, has a relatively long grace period: on average, 55 days for bonds and 34 days
for loans, indicating that lenders are willing to provide borrowers with a long period
to make payments required by court decisions.
A few liability-related clauses, which include cross-default, court orders, and
ERISA events, also specify a threshold amount that triggers the event of default. In
the case of a cross-default clause, the default of another debt security with a
principal above a certain amount prompts a default of the current debt contract.
More restrictive default clauses have lower threshold amounts. Panel C in Table 1
provides the summary statistics for the threshold amounts present in default clauses
as a percentage of the borrower’s total assets. The threshold amounts above which
21 A pending litigation clause differs from a court order clause. Although both relate to litigation, the
former can trigger an event of default if a lawsuit is brought against a borrower, while the latter
constitutes an event of default only if the borrower cannot pay an amount set by a court judgment.
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default is triggered are generally\1 % of a borrower’s total assets in the case of
both bonds and loans. These low thresholds indicate that the clauses are relatively
restrictive.
4 Default clause restrictiveness in bond and loan contracts
4.1 Empirical measures of default clause restrictiveness
To measure the overall restrictiveness of default clauses, we construct two default
clause measures. The first measure is a count of the number of default clauses
present in the lending contract. The second measure is an index that takes into
account the three dimensions of default clauses: the presence of a default clause, the
grace period (if allowed), and the threshold amount (if required).22
We construct the default clause index by first computing an individual
restrictiveness score for each default clause. Individual scores are computed
differently depending on the default clause type. For default clauses that do not
specify a grace period or a threshold amount (e.g., invalid guarantees, nondebt
liabilities, report of fundamental change, or change in control), we assign to the
individual clause score the value of 1 when the clause is present and 0 otherwise. If
the default clause’s specification includes either a grace period or a threshold
amount, the score is given the value of 1, to indicate the existence of the default
clause, plus a value from 0 (least restrictive) to 1 (most restrictive), depending on
the relative strictness of the grace period or threshold amount. The relative strictness
is computed using the distribution of grace periods and threshold amounts for the
full sample of bonds and loans.23 Specifically, we measure the restrictiveness of a
clause with a grace period as follows:
Scoreclause ¼ 1þ Maximum grace periodsample  Grace periodclause
Maximum grace periodsample Minimum grace periodsample ;
ð1Þ
where the restrictiveness of the grace period is measured by the difference between
the maximum grace period of the same clause across the bond and loan samples and
the grace period of the clause whose restrictiveness is being measured, scaled by the
range of the grace periods computed using all same type clauses in the combined
22 Both measures are imperfect proxies for the restrictiveness of default clauses due to their potentially
arbitrary computation. However, they have several advantages. First, they provide an aggregate measure
of the overall restrictiveness of default clauses. Second, they are potentially more objective than if one
were to focus on the presence of an individual clause or a subset of clauses. The use of individual clauses,
as opposed to an aggregate measure, requires a subjective assessment of their relative importance. Third,
these indices are transparent and thus easy to replicate. Similar indices have been constructed to assess the
restrictiveness of covenant packages (e.g., Bradley and Roberts 2004; Moody’s 2010).
23 In this approach, we assume that default clauses without a grace period or a threshold amount are
comparable to the most lenient case of clauses that have one of these features. We also calculate two
alternative indices by assigning either 1.5 or 2 to clauses without features, assuming that these clauses are
comparable to clauses with the medium or toughest strictness in the group of clauses that have these
features. All results are robust to these alternative indices.
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sample. (If the clause has a threshold amount, we replace the grace periods with the
corresponding threshold amounts.) This approach gives us a ranking of the
restrictiveness of the grace period, relative to grace periods attached to similar types
of clauses in the sample. Thus the individual restrictiveness score captures both the
presence of the clause in the debt contract and the strictness of its grace period. It
can take values from 0 (if the clause is not present) to 2 (if the clause is present and
the grace period is the shortest in the sample). We use Eq. (1) to code the individual
restrictiveness scores for clauses on the failure to make principal and interest
payments, covenant breaches, defaults on sinking fund provisions, the failure to
redeem/convert a bond, the presence of pending litigation, and ERISA payment
failure events.
Some default clauses, such as cross-defaults and court orders, specify both grace
periods and threshold amounts. Following the approach in Eq. (1), we measure the
restrictiveness of these clauses by assigning equal weights to the grace periods and
threshold amounts. For instance, the score of the cross-default clause incorporates
the presence of the cross-default clause as well as the relative restrictiveness of its
grace period and threshold amount as follows (the score is computed similarly for
the court order clause):
Scoreclause ¼ 1þ 0:5 Maximum grace periodsample  Grace periodclause
Maximum grace periodsample Minimum grace periodsample
þ 0:5Maximum amountsample  Threshold amountclause
Maximum amountsample Minimum amoutsample :
ð2Þ
In the last step, after computing a score for each default clause present in the loan
or bond contract, we sum the individual scores to obtain the restrictiveness index for
all default clauses in the debt contract. Thus a contract with more restrictive default
clauses has a higher default clause index.
4.2 Univariate results
We provide a set of univariate tests that assess differences between the
restrictiveness of default clauses in bond and loan contracts. We start by comparing
the means and medians of the restrictiveness scores of individual default clauses.
The results in Panel A of Table 1 indicate that, for five out of nine common default
clauses, their individual bond clause scores are significantly lower than the loan
clauses. In addition, the frequencies of three common default clauses (cross-default,
court order, and invalid guarantees) are significantly higher in the loan sample. For
instance, 94.7 % of the loan contracts include cross-default clauses, compared to
51.5 % of the bond contracts, while 91.5 % of the loan contracts include court order
clauses, compared to only 10.2 % of the bond contracts.
In Panel B in Table 1, we report the restrictiveness of the grace periods attached
to the default clauses that are common to bond and loan contracts. The results
indicate that grace periods in the bond contracts are significantly longer than those
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in loan contracts for the majority of the common default clauses. The average grace
period of the interest payment clause is 33 days for bonds, compared to only 4 days
for loans, while the average grace period of the covenant breach clause is 71 days
for bonds, compared to 6 days for loans. In contrast, loan contracts allow for grace
periods of about 30 days on average for bankruptcy filings, while bond contracts do
not provide any grace periods. One explanation for this finding is that bank lenders
give the borrower more time in bankruptcy because they obtain strong control rights
relative to bondholders by providing debtor-in-possession financing. In Panel C in
Table 1, we report the differences between the threshold amounts specified in cross-
default and court-order clauses across bonds and loans and there are no consistent
differences. The average minimum threshold amount associated with the cross-
default clause of bond contracts is 0.60 % of assets, which is significantly lower
(and thus more restrictive) than for loans (0.78 % of assets). However, the average
minimum threshold amount related to the court-order clause is higher in bond
contracts (1.20 % of assets) than in loan contracts (0.94 % of assets).
In Panel D in Table 1, we report the aggregate default clause index, as well as the
number of clauses across bonds and loans. We find that the aggregate measures are
significantly more restrictive in loan contracts than in bond contracts. For instance,
the default clause index is about 60 % higher in loan contracts than in bond
contracts as the loans have an average (median) index of 16.6 (16.3) relative to the
bonds with 10.3 (10.6). We also find that the default clause index exhibits
significant cross-sectional variation, with a standard deviation of 2.0 and 2.7 in the
bond and loan contracts, respectively (untabulated). The number of default clauses
common to both bond and loan contracts is also significantly higher for loans than
for bonds. On average, loan contracts have approximately 1.4 more common clauses
than bond contracts.
In Fig. 1a, we plot the average default clause indices for the loan and bond
samples over time. Consistent with the results above, the figure clearly shows that
loan contracts include more restrictive default clauses than bond contracts in each
sample year. While the restrictiveness of default clauses in the loan contracts is
relatively stable over time, default clauses in bond contracts exhibit more variation,
which could be driven by their higher sensitivity to macroeconomic shocks relative
to loans (e.g., Greenwood et al. 2010). Interestingly, after 2007, the default clause
index of bond contracts drops slightly, while that of loan contracts increases. These
changes indicate that, during the peak of the credit crisis, default costs became more
relevant. They have a stronger negative effect on the restrictiveness of default
clauses in bond contracts because of the higher renegotiation costs and lower
priority claims but also because the liquidation costs are higher in challenging
economic times. In Fig. 1b, we plot the average number of common default clauses
in both loan and bond contracts over our sample period. The time distribution of the
number of default clauses exhibits a fairly similar pattern, showing that loan
contracts in each year have a greater number of default clauses, on average, than
bond contracts.
In Fig. 2a, b, we plot the average default clause index and number of common
default clauses for each category of credit ratings (from AAA to D) to assess
whether the average findings documented above might be due to differences in
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credit risk between firms that issue bonds and loans. Figure 2a shows that the
default clause indices increase as credit ratings reflect higher risks from AAA to D.
As credit quality deteriorates, the default clauses in both bond and loan contracts
become more restrictive, consistent with default clauses providing more lender
protection. However, regardless of the credit rating level, the default clause indices
are significantly more restrictive for loans than bonds. The relationship between
credit ratings and the restrictiveness of default clauses continues to hold in the bond
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Fig. 1 Distribution of default clause index and number of default clauses over time. a The average
default clause index for bonds and loans over time. b The average number of the nine common default
clauses for bonds and loans over time
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sample when we plot the average number of common default clauses against credit
ratings in Fig. 2b. We note that, relative to bond contracts, the slope of the linear
approximation is flatter in the loan sample, indicating that the steep relation between
credit ratings and the restrictiveness of default clauses in Fig. 2a might be driven by
the restrictiveness of the terms in the default clauses in loan contracts (i.e., grace
periods and threshold amounts). For high credit quality borrowers, bondholders
demand fewer common default clauses than bank syndicates, indicating that
bondholders are less concerned about protecting the value of their claims when the
probability of the borrower becoming insolvent is low. However, for riskier
borrowers, bondholders demand as many common clauses as the banks.
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Fig. 2 Distribution of the default clause index and number of default clauses by credit rating. a The
average default clause index for each credit rating category. b The average number of the nine common
default clauses for each credit rating category
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One downside of the comparisons above is that the firms that issue bonds and
loans are different and unobservable firm-specific factors may contribute to the
‘‘restrictiveness gap’’ between default clauses in bond and loan contracts. To
mitigate this concern, we compare the default clause restrictiveness for bonds and
loans issued by the same firm in the same year. We identify 522 firms that issue both
bonds and loans during the same year; this sample allows us to assess within-firm
variation in the default clauses. In Panel A of Table 2, we report the differences in
the default clause index, the number of common default clauses, and the number of
clauses between bond and loan contracts. We find that all differences are negative
and significant. More than 95 % of the differences between bonds and loans are
Table 2 Default clauses of bonds and loans issued by the same firm in the same year
Panel A: Default clause index
Difference (bond–loan)
N Mean Median SD % Negative
Default clause index 522 -4.98*** -4.96 2.59 97
No. of default clauses (common) 522 -1.16*** -1.00 1.04 76
No. of default clauses (all) 522 -3.27*** -3.00 1.80 96
Panel B: Presence of individual default clauses
Difference (bond–loan)
N Mean Median SD % Negative
Bankruptcy filing 522 0.26*** 0.25 0.25 0
Principal payment 522 0.00 0.00 0.06 3
Interest payment 522 -0.31*** -0.27 0.14 98
Covenant breach 522 -0.51*** -0.50 0.20 96
Cross-default 522 -0.85*** -0.21 0.95 87
Court order 522 -1.29*** -1.74 0.83 92
Invalid guarantees 522 -0.06*** 0.00 0.46 16
Nondebt liabilities 522 0.01 0.00 0.04 0
Report of fundamental change 522 0.01 0.00 0.07 0
Panel C: Grace period (days)
Difference (bond–loan)
N Mean Median SD % Positive
Bankruptcy filing 522 -32*** 30 31 0
Principal payment 522 0 0 2 3
Interest payment 522 29*** 25 13 98
Covenant breach 522 62*** 60 24 96
Cross-default 299 13*** 10 17 58
Court order 115 22*** 30 17 70
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negative for the default clause index or the total number of default clauses. We also
compare the restrictiveness of the nine common clauses (Table 2, Panel B) and
grace periods of the six clauses that include this feature (Table 2, Panel C). The
results are generally consistent with those in Table 1, indicating that borrower
differences do not explain the differences in the restrictiveness of the default clauses
across bond and loan contracts. Finally, in Panel D of Table 2, we partition the
sample based on the relative timing of the issuance of the bond and loan contracts.
We find that, regardless of whether a bond is issued before or after a loan, the
default clauses in bond contracts are significantly less restrictive, suggesting that
bondholders do not simply free ride the default clauses in the loan contracts.
To summarize, the univariate results in this section indicate that, consistent with
our prediction that lenders require less restrictive default clauses when the expected
costs of triggering them are higher, default clauses are less restrictive in bond
contracts than in syndicated loan contracts. Bondholders expect greater default costs
due to their inability to coordinate efficiently and because they own more
subordinated claims.
4.3 Multivariate results
We examine the difference between bond and loan default clause restrictiveness in a
multivariate analysis by pooling all bonds and loans and estimating the following
model:
Default clause index No: of default clausesð Þ ¼ a0 þ b0Bond þ b1Firm controls
þ b2Bond=Loan controlsþ Year FE þ Industry FE þ Lead underwriter FE þ e;
ð3Þ
Table 2 continued
Panel D: Timing of bond and loan issuances
Difference (bond–loan)
N Mean Median SD % Negative
Bond offering date[Loan issuance date 222 -5.04*** -5.22*** 2.66 96
Bond offering date = Loan issuance date 9 -5.10*** -4.70*** 4.34 89
Bond offering date\Loan issuance date 291 -4.91*** -4.89*** 2.54 98
p value for mean difference of Groups 1 versus 3 0.57
This table presents descriptive statistics of default clauses for a subsample of firms that issue both bonds
and loans in the same year (522 firm-years). For each firm-year, we report the difference between the
bond(s) and loan(s) with regard to the use of default clauses in general (Panel A), individual default
clauses (Panel B), and grace periods of individual default clauses (Panel C). In Panel D, we classify the
522 firm-years into three groups based on the timing of the bond offering/loan issuance and report for
each group the difference between the bonds and loans with regard to the default clause index. If there is
more than one bond (or loan) issue for a firm-year, we take the average for all bonds (or loans) and report
the difference between bonds and loans
***, **, * Significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels
1616 N. Li et al.
123
where Bond is an indicator variable equal to one if the contract is a bond contract
and zero if it is a loan contract. We employ an OLS (Poisson) regression when the
dependent variable is the default clause index (the number of default clauses). Since
a firm may issue multiple debt securities, we cluster the standard errors at the firm
level to correct for any within-firm dependence.
We rely on the following variables to control for the effect of credit quality on
the restrictiveness of default clauses: firm size (Firm size), leverage ratio
(Leverage), interest coverage ratio (Interest coverage), market-to-book ratio
(Market-to-book), and credit rating (Credit rating). Credit quality is an important
factor in determining the restrictiveness of default clauses (as illustrated by Fig. 2).
We expect that default clauses will be more restrictive in the debt contracts of firms
with lower credit quality; these are the firms that likely face greater agency
problems. We use firm credit ratings for loan contracts and bond ratings at issuance
for bond contracts. All firm characteristics are measured in the fiscal year before the
debt issuance date. We also control for a number of other bond/loan characteristics:
the bond yield or loan spread (Yield/Interest spread), the size of the bond/loan
(Bond/Loan size), the maturity of bond/loan (Maturity), and the number of
covenants in the bond/loan contract (Number of covenants).24 These contractual
terms may substitute or supplement the monitoring role of the default clauses.
Although a covenant violation is an event of default in all contracts, the default
clauses do not specify the details of covenants’ terms. Therefore, it is important to
control for the number of covenants in Eq. (3). The relation between the number of
covenants and the default clause restrictiveness, however, is unclear. Lenders may
require both a higher number of covenants and more restrictive default clauses when
there is higher uncertainty about the future performance of the borrower. However,
a higher number of covenants enhances a lender’s monitoring, thus the number of
covenants may also substitute for default clause restrictiveness.
Finally, we control for year and industry fixed effects to consider time series
changes in contractual arrangements that are driven by changing conditions in debt
markets and industry-specific factors that may affect the specification of debt
contracts, respectively. Year fixed effects also account for macroeconomic
conditions. Investors require more protection when aggregate default risk increases
in unfavorable economic times (e.g., Collin-Dufresne et al. 2001). We further
control for underwriter fixed effects. Choi and Triantis (2013) and Kahan and
Klausner (1997), among others, suggest that underwriters learn from the analysis of
the contractual terms employed by peers or from the prior contracts they write. They
have substantial influence on contract terms because of their contractual experience
and their responsibility to market the debt securities.25
Table 3 reports the summary statistics of the bond (Panel A) and loan (Panel B)
samples used in the regressions. The requirement for availability of control
variables leads to a significant drop in the sample sizes. Nevertheless, the average
number of default clauses and the default clause index of bonds and loans remain
24 Our results are robust to dropping these bond/loan variables from the regressions.
25 In the context of bond contracts, De Franco et al. (2014) document that the restrictiveness of covenant
packages is very sticky over time. This is partly driven by bond underwriters.
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very similar to those reported in Table 1. An average firm that issues bonds has total
assets of $35 billion and a leverage ratio of 25 %; the average bond yield spread is
about 178 basis points, and the average bond maturity is around 12 years (Panel A).
Not surprisingly, the average firm size in the loan sample is significantly smaller
than that in the bond sample, consistent with large firms being more likely to issue
public debt (e.g., Denis and Mihov 2003; Houston and James 1996). On average, the
Table 3 Summary statistics
Panel A: Bond sample
Variable N Mean P25 Median P75 SD
Default clause index 2366 10.10 8.92 10.17 11.16 1.78
No. of default clauses 2366 5.69 5.00 6.00 6.00 1.01
Intangible capital 2366 0.16 0.04 0.13 0.23 0.15
R&D capital (%) 2366 2.92 0.00 0.00 5.76 4.60
Total assets ($MM) 2366 34,955 5158 15,965 33,341 56,293
Leverage 2366 0.25 0.16 0.23 0.32 0.13
Interest coverage 2366 13.72 4.63 9.40 17.27 13.58
Market-to-book 2366 1.84 1.28 1.58 2.21 0.78
Prior loan ($MM) 2366 4522 650 2319 5188 6116
Credit rating 2366 7.49 6.00 7.00 9.00 3.13
Yield spread 2366 1.78 0.81 1.43 2.31 1.39
Bond size ($MM) 2366 398 135 300 500 414
Bond maturity (years) 2366 11.62 5.00 10.00 11.00 8.64
No. of covenants 2366 4.69 2.00 5.00 6.00 3.40
Panel B: Loan sample
Variable N Mean P25 Median P75 SD
Default clause index 2495 16.29 14.73 16.00 17.55 2.43
No. of default clauses 2495 10.04 8.00 10.00 11.00 2.23
Intangible capital 2495 0.19 0.05 0.16 0.29 0.16
R&D capital 2495 2.28 0.00 0.00 2.55 4.79
Total assets ($MM) 2495 5450 939 2083 5404 8624
Leverage 2495 0.31 0.17 0.28 0.41 0.19
Interest coverage 2495 12.07 3.11 5.70 10.95 33.01
Market-to-book 2495 1.64 1.14 1.42 1.87 0.80
Credit rating 2495 11.14 9.00 11.00 13.00 3.36
Interest spread 2495 1.60 0.63 1.25 2.25 1.25
Loan size ($MM) 2495 19.65 18.98 19.67 20.37 1.10
Loan maturity (years) 2495 3.94 3.00 5.00 5.00 1.84
No. of covenants 2495 5.27 3.00 4.00 8.00 3.28
This table reports summary statistics for the full samples of bonds and loans used in the regression
analyses. Variable definitions are in ‘‘Appendix 2’’. The sample sizes are smaller than those in Table 1
due to missing explanatory variables
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loans in the sample have an interest spread of 160 basis points and a maturity of
4 years (Panel B).
The multivariate regression results are reported in Panel A of Table 4. In addition
to the results based on the full sample of bonds and loans (columns 1 and 3), we also
report results for the sample of bond and loans issued by the same firm in the same
year (columns 2 and 4). We find consistent and strong evidence that default clauses
are less restrictive in bond contracts than in loan contracts, as reflected by the
negative and strongly significant coefficient on the indicator variable Bond. The
effect is economically significant: controlling for firm fundamentals and debt
contract characteristics, the bond default clause index is smaller by at least 5 units
relative to the loan index, representing approximately 30 % of the mean default
clause index in loan contracts. Among the control variables, the effect of Credit
Rating is positive and significant, consistent with our expectation that default
clauses are less restrictive for higher quality borrowers. The coefficients of Number
of covenants are significantly positive, indicating that covenant intensity and the
default clause restrictiveness complement each other in monitoring the borrowing
firm. Lenders employ both more restrictive default clauses and more intensive
covenants to monitor riskier borrowers.26
In Panel B of Table 4, we provide further evidence on the difference between
bonds and loans by examining the difference in the grace periods of two default
clauses—interest payment and covenant breach clauses—in a multivariate analysis.
As shown in Table 1, these two clauses are present in all bond and loan contracts,
and their grace periods have significant variation. We re-estimate Eq. (3) using as
the dependent variable the natural logarithm of one plus the grace period of the
interest payment or covenant-breach clause. The coefficient on the indicator
variable Bond is positive and significant across all columns, indicating that the grace
periods of interest-payment and covenant-breach clauses in bond contracts are
significantly longer than those in loan contracts, consistent with these two clauses
being less restrictive in bond contracts. Given that the dependent variable is the
logarithm of one plus the grace period, the results indicate that, for a loan contract
with average grace periods for interest payment and covenant breach clauses, the
corresponding grace periods in a bond contract are longer by 7 and 30 times,
respectively.
Overall, the results indicate that banks demand more restrictive default clauses
than bondholders, consistent with our hypothesis that lenders require less restrictive
default clauses when the costs of triggering them are higher. This evidence implies
that banks’ ability to coordinate in debt renegotiations, as well as their monitoring
efficiency and superior access to private information, allow them to demand and
enforce more protective default clauses. These clauses facilitate a more timely
allocation of control rights to banks, ahead of bondholders, allowing banks to
extract value from borrowers instead of forcing them into bankruptcy (e.g., Ayotte
and Morrison 2009; Gilson et al. 1990). In contrast, bondholders’ preference for
26 In untabulated tests, we try two alternative specifications that use the full sample of bonds and loans.
First, we include all loans in Table 4 and replace Credit rating with O-score. Second, we include all loans
in Table 4, assign the lowest rating to unrated firms and include a dummy variable for unrated firms. In
both cases, the results are very similar to those in Table 4.
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Table 4 Default clause restrictiveness for bonds and loans: multivariate analyses
Panel A: Default clause measures
Default clause index No. of default clauses
Full sample Same firm sample Full sample Same firm sample
1 2 3 4
Bond -5.617***
(-26.11)
-5.247***
(-11.47)
-0.518***
(-27.04)
-0.502***
(-12.17)
Firm size -0.177**
(-2.43)
-0.187*
(-1.70)
-0.018***
(-3.02)
-0.022**
(-2.22)
Leverage -0.071
(-0.22)
-0.418
(-0.51)
-0.005
(-0.18)
-0.021
(-0.29)
Interest coverage -0.001
(-0.70)
0.001
(0.26)
-0.000
(-0.31)
-0.000
(-0.06)
Market-to-book -0.013
(-0.22)
-0.099
(-0.84)
-0.000
(-0.08)
-0.009
(-0.87)
Credit rating 0.171***
(6.55)
0.187***
(3.17)
0.018***
(8.67)
0.019***
(3.04)
Yield/interest spread 0.056
(1.23)
0.055
(0.78)
0.009**
(2.03)
0.007
(1.04)
Bond/loan size -0.123*
(-1.95)
0.039
(0.35)
-0.009*
(-1.65)
0.005
(0.49)
Maturity 0.000
(0.03)
0.002
(0.22)
0.000
(0.37)
0.001
(0.90)
Number of covenants 0.115***
(6.74)
0.117***
(3.09)
0.008***
(5.31)
0.008**
(2.38)
Model specification OLS OLS Poisson Poisson
Industry and year fixed
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lead underwriter fixed
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 4861 908 4861 908
Adjusted/pseudo R2 0.79 0.75 0.15 0.11
Panel B: Grace periods
Log(1 ? grace period)
Interest payment Covenant breach
Full sample Same firm sample Full sample Same firm sample
1 2 3 4
Bond 1.899***
(37.07)
1.699***
(17.30)
3.322***
(27.93)
3.185***
(10.18)
Firm size 0.035***
(2.90)
0.042*
(1.73)
0.066**
(2.41)
0.035
(0.72)
1620 N. Li et al.
123
Table 4 continued
Panel B: Grace periods
Log(1 ? grace period)
Interest payment Covenant breach
Full sample Same firm sample Full sample Same firm sample
1 2 3 4
Leverage 0.045
(0.61)
-0.051
(-0.32)
-0.038
(-0.26)
-0.294
(-0.73)
Interest coverage 0.001
(1.46)
0.002**
(2.33)
-0.000
(-0.21)
-0.000
(-0.11)
Market-to-book 0.007
(0.53)
0.009
(0.39)
0.028
(0.78)
-0.079*
(-1.74)
Credit rating -0.015***
(-2.70)
0.004
(0.38)
0.002
(0.16)
-0.000
(-0.00)
Yield/interest spread 0.018*
(1.72)
0.007
(0.35)
-0.033*
(-1.73)
-0.075
(-1.50)
Bond/loan size 0.034***
(3.23)
0.055*
(1.85)
0.019
(0.79)
-0.059
(-0.59)
Maturity 0.001
(0.93)
0.001
(0.47)
-0.002
(-0.98)
0.002
(0.79)
Number of covenants 0.000
(0.09)
-0.013
(-1.54)
-0.008
(-0.67)
-0.009
(-0.45)
Model specification OLS OLS OLS OLS
Industry and year fixed
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lead underwriter fixed
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 4861 908 4861 908
Adjusted/pseudo R2 0.84 0.87 0.79 0.80
This table presents the results for comparing the restrictiveness of default clauses across bonds and loans
(Panel A) and the grace periods of interest payment and covenant breach clauses (Panel B) using
multivariate analyses. The ‘‘Full Sample’’ consists of all bonds and loans. The ‘‘Same Firm Sample’’
consists of bonds and loans issued by the same firm in the same year. Bond is an indicator variable that
equals to 1 if the contract is a bond contract and 0 otherwise. In columns 1 and 2 of Panel A, we report
OLS regression results, where the dependent variable is the default clause index of a bond, calculated as
the sum of individual default clause scores. In columns 3 and 4 of Panel A, we report Poisson regression
results, where the dependent variable is the number of default clauses. In Panel B, we report OLS
regression results, where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of one plus the grace period of
the interest payment or covenant breach clause. The t- (z)-statistics are reported in parentheses
***, **, * Significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are clustered at
the firm level. Other variable definitions are in ‘‘Appendix 2’’
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fewer and less restrictive default clauses is consistent with their limited ability to
negotiate with borrowers to avoid bankruptcy events. These events affect the value
of bondholders’ claims more negatively due to bankruptcy transaction costs and
their lower priority in liquidation proceedings.
5 Costs of default and default clause restrictiveness
5.1 Costs of default measures
In this section, we further investigate how the restrictiveness of default clauses
varies with lenders’ expected costs when events of default are declared. We
examine two types of default costs. The first one is the destruction of going-concern
values when assets are sold. Alderson and Betker (1996) argue that the primary cost
of liquidation is the destruction of going-concern values when assets are sold.27
Because intangible assets are often firm specific and are more valuable to the firm
itself than to other firms (John 1993), going-concern values are more likely to be
preserved if the firm owns a smaller share of intangible assets relative to total assets.
We thus measure expected bankruptcy costs with two proxies that capture the
amount of intangible assets. The first measure, R&D capital, is the amount of
capitalized research and development (R&D) expenditures scaled by total assets
(multiplied by 100). Following Amir et al. (2003), we assume that R&D
expenditures are capitalized over 5 years using the straight-line amortization
method. We also assume that R&D expenditures are spent in the middle of the year.
The second measure, Intangible capital, is the total amount of capitalized R&D,
advertising expenses, and goodwill scaled by total assets.28 We apply the same
amortization rate (20 %) to capitalize advertising expenses as in the case of R&D
expenditures. We expect that debtholders (especially bond investors) will demand
less restrictive default clauses if the firm has significant intangible assets.
The second type of default cost relates to the division of assets among lenders of
different seniority classes, which is governed by inter-creditor contracts. In
particular, bank debt is generally more senior to public debt; therefore the presence
of bank loans in the debt structure will lower the recovery rate of bonds in the
bankruptcy process, imposing additional costs on bondholders. We proxy for these
default costs for bondholders with the amount of syndicated loans outstanding at the
time when a bond is issued (Prior loan). To the extent that bondholders’ recovery
rates decrease when an event of default occurs, we expect a negative relation
between the size of outstanding bank loans and the restrictiveness of default clauses
in bond contracts, as bondholders are incentivized to avoid an event of default.
27 There are two other types of bankruptcy costs that are borne by creditors: (1) the direct administrative
expenses paid in fees to various third parties involved in the bankruptcy proceedings and (2) the loss of
tax credits that the firm would have received had it not gone bankrupt. We cannot measure the
expectations about these costs.
28 As reported intangible assets are less likely to be firm specific (since by definition they are acquired by
the firm), we exclude them from the calculation of Intangible capital. The results are qualitatively similar
when we include them into the measurement of Intangible capital.
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5.2 Cross-sectional analysis within the bond sample
We begin by separately examining the determinants of the restrictiveness of default
clauses in bond contracts, as the costs associated with the presence of senior loans
apply only to bondholders. Using the measures that capture the restrictiveness of
default clauses defined in Sect. 4 as dependent variables, we estimate the following
model:
Default clause index No: of default clausesð Þ ¼ a0 þ b0Intangible capital R&D capitalð Þ
þ b1Prior loanþ b2Firm controlsþ b3Bond controlsþ Year FE þ Industry FE
þ Lead underwriter FE þ e:
ð4Þ
We employ an OLS (Poisson) regression when the dependent variable is the
default clause index (the number of default clauses). We control for the same firm
and bond characteristics as in Eq. (3). Negative values of b0 and b1 are consistent
with our prediction that default clauses are set less restrictively when the costs of
triggering them are larger for bondholders.
Our measures for bondholders’ expected bankruptcy costs are economically
significant. On average, capitalized R&D expenditures account for about 3 % of
total assets, while the total amount of capitalized R&D and advertising expenses and
goodwill account for 16 % of total assets (see Table 3, Panel A). The average firm
has syndicated loan amounts outstanding of $4.5 billion dollars when it issues a
bond; this accounts for about 13 % of average total assets.
In Panel A of Table 5, we present the results of estimating Eq. (4). We report the
results for the default clause index in columns 1 and 2 and those for the number of
default clauses in columns 3 and 4. The results based on these two measures are
fairly consistent, generally supporting our prediction that the restrictiveness of
default clauses in bond contracts decreases with expected bankruptcy costs. The
coefficients of Intangible capital and R&D capital are all significantly negative,
indicating that bond default clauses are less restrictive for firms with higher
liquidation costs. The effects of expected bankruptcy costs are also economically
significant. A one standard deviation increase in these proxies lowers the
restrictiveness index of default clauses by 0.21–0.24, which accounts for
11–14 % of the standard deviation of the index. The statistical and economic
significance of the results are similar when we use the number of default clauses as a
dependent variable (columns 3 and 4). We further find that the coefficient of Prior
loan is negative and statistically significant across all regressions. For instance, the
effect of a one standard deviation increase in bank loan amounts outstanding on the
default clause index accounts for around 18 % of the index’s standard deviation.
Our findings show that the increase in liquidation costs as a consequence of higher
existing senior claims leads to a significant decrease in the restrictiveness of bond
default clauses.
Beatty et al. (2012) show that the use of a cross-acceleration clause in bond
contracts increases with borrowers’ going-concern relative to liquidation values,
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Table 5 Determinants of default clause restrictiveness: bond sample
Panel A: Include cross-default clause
Default clause index No. of default clauses
1 2 3 4
Intangible capital -1.616***
(-3.41)
-0.175***
(-3.84)
R&D capital -0.046***
(-2.78)
-0.005***
(-3.01)
Prior loan -0.041***
(-4.55)
-0.043***
(-5.04)
-0.003***
(-4.25)
-0.004***
(-4.77)
Firm size -0.084
(-0.96)
-0.057
(-0.63)
-0.006
(-0.75)
-0.004
(-0.43)
Leverage 0.123
(0.17)
-0.069
(-0.10)
0.029
(0.45)
0.008
(0.13)
Interest coverage -0.006
(-0.89)
-0.002
(-0.35)
-0.000
(-0.42)
0.000
(0.26)
Market-to-book 0.067
(0.74)
0.064
(0.68)
0.003
(0.28)
0.002
(0.23)
Credit rating 0.100***
(2.70)
0.102***
(2.80)
0.009**
(2.50)
0.010***
(2.58)
Yield spread -0.015
(-0.31)
0.001
(0.03)
0.001
(0.24)
0.003
(0.64)
Bond size -0.192***
(-3.88)
-0.154***
(-3.20)
-0.017***
(-3.89)
-0.013***
(-2.83)
Maturity -0.006
(-1.28)
-0.004
(-0.92)
-0.001
(-1.15)
-0.000
(-0.81)
Number of covenants 0.216***
(8.11)
0.218***
(8.21)
0.019***
(7.67)
0.019***
(7.68)
Model specification OLS OLS Poisson Poisson
Industry and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lead underwriter fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 2366 2366 2366 2366
Adjusted/pseudo R2 0.40 0.40 0.02 0.02
Panel B: Exclude cross-default clause
Default clause index No. of default clauses
1 2 3 4
Intangible capital -0.861**
(-2.08)
-0.106**
(-2.47)
R&D capital -0.030**
(-2.12)
-0.003**
(-2.21)
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consistent with our findings in Panel A of Table 5. As different clauses could play
different monitoring roles, it is not clear whether Beatty et al.’s conclusions can be
extended to other types of default clauses. To rule out the possibility that the results
in Panel A of Table 5 are completely driven by the cross-acceleration clause, we
repeat the analyses with the cross-acceleration clause excluded and report the results
in Panel B. For brevity, we only report the effects of expected bankruptcy costs. We
continue to find significantly negative effects for Intangible capital, R&D capital,
and Prior loan, indicating that the effects of expected bankruptcy costs are not
driven by the cross-acceleration clause.
To provide additional support for the notion that default clauses are designed to
partly address inter-creditor coordination issues, we further explore the effects of
prior loan lenders on the association between expected bankruptcy costs and the
default clause restrictiveness in bond contracts. We compare the effects of expect
bankruptcy costs in subsamples constructed based on the magnitude of the loan
amount outstanding (scaled by the bond amount), under the assumption that the
inter-creditor coordination issues are more significant when there is more senior
debt outstanding.29 The results in Table 6 indicate that the coefficients of Intangible
capital and R&D capital are significantly negative only in the subsample with the
largest syndicated debt amount outstanding (i.e., the top quartile). Differences in the
Table 5 continued
Panel B: Exclude cross-default clause
Default clause index No. of default clauses
1 2 3 4
Prior loan -0.027***
(-3.75)
-0.028***
(-4.02)
-0.002***
(-3.30)
-0.003***
(-3.54)
Model specification OLS OLS Poisson Poisson
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lead underwriter fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 2366 2366 2366 2366
Adjusted/pseudo R2 0.32 0.32 0.01 0.01
This table presents the results for the determinants of the restrictiveness of default clauses in the bond
sample. In columns 1 and 2 of each panel, we report OLS regression results using as the dependent
variable the default clause index of a bond, calculated as the sum of individual default clause scores. In
columns 3 and 4, we report Poisson regression results, where the dependent variable is the number of
default clauses. Panel A presents the results using all default clauses. Panel B presents the results with the
cross-default clause excluded from the calculation of default clause index and number of default clauses.
To conserve space, the effects of control variables are omitted from Panel B. The t- (z)-statistics are
reported in parentheses
***, **, * Significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are clustered at
the firm level. Variable definitions are in ‘‘Appendix 2’’
29 We also compare the effects of expected bankruptcy costs in subsamples constructed based on the
number of existing loan lenders, assuming that the inter-creditor coordination problems are more serious
when there are more existing loan lenders that need to negotiate. We find similar results.
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effects of Intangible capital across the subsamples are significant at the 10 % level.
The results on R&D capital are not as strong, which is not surprising given that its
economic significance relative to total assets is smaller relative to intangible capital.
In sum, we find that the number and restrictiveness of default clauses in bond
contracts significantly decrease with expected bankruptcy costs, and that bond-
holders use less restrictive default clauses when bank loans are present in the capital
structure of the borrower. We further document that the effect of expected
bankruptcy costs on default clause restrictiveness is stronger when the potential
inter-creditor coordination problem is more pronounced. This evidence is consistent
with our hypothesis that lenders require less restrictive default clauses when the
expected costs of triggering them are higher. Bondholders design debt contracts to
avoid the costs associated with default liquidations by accepting less restrictive
default clauses that lower the probability of default.
5.3 The pooled sample of bonds and loans
As discussed in Sect. 2, we expect that loan default clause restrictiveness is less
sensitive to liquidation costs than the restrictiveness in bond contracts. An event
of default is less likely to lead to asset liquidation in the case of bank lenders due
to their lower renegotiation costs. To support this prediction, we combine the bond
and loan samples and include an indicator variable for bonds (Bond) and its
interactions with Intangible capital and R&D capital. We estimate the following
OLS (for the default clause index) or Poisson (for the number of default clauses)
regression:
Default clause index No: of default clausesð Þ ¼ a0 þ b0Bond
þ b1Intangible capital ðR&D capitalÞ
þ b2Bond  Intangible capital R&D capitalð Þ þ b3Firm controls þ b4Bond=Loan
Controlsþ Year FE þ Industry FE þ Lead underwriter FE þ e:
ð5Þ
We control for the same set of firm and bond/loan characteristics as in Table 4.
In addition to a negative value of b0 as in Sect. 4.2, we expect that b2 will be
negative. We do not have a prediction on the sign of b1 because the effect of
liquidation costs on the default clause restrictiveness in loan contracts is not clear,
as an event of default in loan contracts may not result in liquidation of the
borrower’s assets.
The results in Table 7 are consistent with our predictions. First, the coefficients
on Bond are strongly negative in all regressions, consistent with the results in
Table 4. Second, the coefficients of the interaction terms are all significantly
negative, indicating that the effect of liquidation costs on default clause
restrictiveness is stronger in bond contracts than in loan contracts. Third, the effect
of Intangible capital is insignificant in column 1, while R&D capital is insignificant
in both columns 2 and 4, indicating that default clause restrictiveness in loan
contracts is not affected by expected liquidation costs. The effects of the control
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Table 7 Determinants of default clause restrictiveness: pooled sample
Default clause index No. of default clauses
1 2 3 4
Bond -5.357***
(-23.88)
-5.583***
(-25.93)
-0.492***
(-24.62)
-0.513***
(-26.72)
Intangible capital -0.602
(-1.59)
-0.069**
(-2.05)
Intangible capital 9 bond -1.608***
(-2.84)
-0.171***
(-3.24)
R&D capital -0.018
(-1.36)
-0.001
(-1.24)
R&D capital 9 bond -0.038*
(-1.93)
-0.005***
(-2.69)
Firm size -0.169**
(-2.47)
-0.154**
(-2.23)
-0.017***
(-3.09)
-0.016***
(-2.76)
Leverage -0.045
(-0.14)
-0.188
(-0.59)
-0.001
(-0.06)
-0.012
(-0.47)
Interest coverage -0.001
(-0.87)
-0.001
(-0.47)
-0.000
(-0.45)
-0.000
(-0.12)
Market-to-book 0.026
(0.45)
0.039
(0.65)
0.003
(0.55)
0.004
(0.67)
Credit rating 0.175***
(6.91)
0.177***
(7.05)
0.018***
(8.93)
0.019***
(8.99)
Yield/interest spread 0.035
(0.79)
0.057
(1.28)
0.007
(1.61)
0.009**
(2.08)
Bond/loan size -0.144***
(-2.68)
-0.122**
(-2.03)
-0.011**
(-2.33)
-0.009*
(-1.72)
Maturity -0.002
(-0.37)
0.001
(0.14)
-0.000
(-0.07)
0.000
(0.43)
Number of covenants 0.118***
(7.05)
0.116***
(6.84)
0.008***
(5.70)
0.008***
(5.38)
Model specification OLS OLS Poisson Poisson
Industry and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lead underwriter fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 4861 4861 4861 4861
Adjusted/pseudo R2 0.79 0.79 0.15 0.15
This table presents the results for the determinants of the restrictiveness of default clauses in the pooled
sample of bond and loan contracts with credit ratings available. In columns 1 and 2, we report OLS
regression results using as the dependent variable the default clause index of a bond, calculated as the sum
of individual default clause scores. In columns 3 and 4, we report Poisson regression results, where the
dependent variable is the number of default clauses. The t- (z)-statistics are reported in parentheses
***, **, * Significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are clustered at
the firm level. The variable Bond is an indicator variable for bonds. Other variable definitions are in
‘‘Appendix 2’’
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Table 8 Determinants of default clause restrictiveness: propensity score matched sample
Panel A: First-stage probit model for matching
Bond
Coef. z-stat
Discretionary accruals -0.015*** -3.07
Firm size 0.503*** 40.28
Market-to-book 0.121*** 6.51
O-score -0.041*** -2.85
Tangibility 0.773*** 10.69
Leverage -0.190 -1.43
Capital market access 0.460*** 10.10
No. of observations 11,242
Pseudo R2 0.42
Panel B: Summary statistics for bonds and loans in matched sample
Mean p value for T test
Bonds Loans
Discretionary accruals 0.32 0.43 0.297
Firm size 8.53 8.53 0.851
Market-to-book 1.75 1.80 0.124
O-score -5.29 -5.27 0.815
Tangibility 0.42 0.42 0.691
Leverage 0.27 0.27 0.780
Capital market access 0.83 0.85 0.195
Default clause index 10.35 15.59 0.000
No. of default clauses 5.83 9.35 0.000
Panel C: Determinants of default clause restrictiveness
Default clause index No. of default clauses
1 2 3 4 5 6
Bond -5.677***
(-19.87)
-5.327***
(-17.37)
-5.617***
(-19.70)
-0.525***
(-20.75)
-0.488***
(-18.08)
-0.517***
(-20.49)
Intangible capital 0.282
(0.48)
0.007
(0.13)
Intangible
capital 9 bond
-2.228***
(-2.86)
-0.234***
(-3.29)
R&D capital 0.002
(0.10)
0.000
(0.22)
R&D capital 9 bond -0.037*
(-1.67)
-0.005**
(-2.44)
Model specification OLS OLS OLS Poisson Poisson Poisson
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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variables are also consistent with those in Tables 4 and 5. In particular, the effects
of Credit rating and Number of covenants are all significantly positive.30
Firms issuing bonds and loans differ fundamentally (Bharath et al. 2008; Hadlock
and James 2002; Krishnaswami et al. 1999). To further control for the differences in
firm characteristics across the two samples of bonds and loans, we employ
propensity-score matching to create a matched sample of firms that issue bonds and
loans. We match firms that issue bonds to those that issue loans based on firm size,
market-to-book, O-score, asset tangibility, leverage ratio, the ability to access
capital market, and discretionary accruals (Bharath et al. 2008). Definitions of these
matching variables are provided in ‘‘Appendix 2’’. Using nearest neighbor matching
with no replacement and a caliper of 0.01, we obtain a matched sample of 2164
observations (1082 bonds and 1082 loans).
Panel A of Table 8 presents the results for the first-stage probit regression.
Consistent with Bharath et al. (2008), larger firms and firms with higher accounting
quality, higher market-to-book ratio, lower credit risk, higher asset tangibility, and
better access to the capital market are more likely to issue bonds. Following
Armstrong et al. (2010), we examine the covariate balance between the bonds and
loans to ensure that the observable dimensions of the matched pairs are similar. We
compare the means of matching variables across bonds and loans in the matched
Table 8 continued
Panel C: Determinants of default clause restrictiveness
Default clause index No. of default clauses
1 2 3 4 5 6
Industry and year
fixed effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lead underwriter
fixed effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164
Adjusted/pseudo R2 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.11 0.11 0.11
We repeat the regression used to generate the results in Tables 4 and 7 using a matched sample of bonds
and loans and report the results in this table. We use propensity score matching to match firms based on
the determinants of debt-market choice. Specifically, we match firms that issue bonds to those that issue
loans on discretionary accruals, firm size, market-to-book, O-score, tangibility, leverage, and capital
market access. Using the nearest neighbor matching with no replacement and a caliper of 0.01, we obtain
a matched sample of 2164 observations. Panel A presents the first-stage probit regression results. Panel B
reports summary statistics of matching variables and default clause restrictiveness measures for bonds and
loans in the matched sample. Panel C presents the regression results for the effects of expected bank-
ruptcy costs on default clause restrictiveness using the matched sample. The t- (z)-statistics are reported
in parentheses. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The variable Bond is an indicator
variable for bonds. Other variable definitions are in ‘‘Appendix 2’’
***, **, * Significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively
30 In untabulated tests, we run two alternative specifications that use the full sample of bond and loans.
First, we include all loans by replacing Credit rating with O-score. Second, we include all loans by
assigning the lowest rating to unrated firms and include a dummy variable for unrated firms in the
regression. In both cases, the results are very similar to those reported in Table 7.
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sample in Panel B of Table 8. The differences across bonds and loans are all
statistically insignificant, indicating that we obtain a desirable covariate balance.
Finally, we repeat the regressions used to generate the results in Tables 4 and 7
using the matched sample and report the results in Panel C of Table 8. We find
qualitatively similar results, which indicates that our findings are robust to
controlling for the endogeneity of debt market choice.
The results in this section indicate that bond contracts have less restrictive default
clauses when the expected default costs, proxied by the amount of intangible assets
and existing syndicated loans, are higher. In contrast, the default clause
restrictiveness in loan contracts is less sensitive to the extent to which the
borrowing firms rely on intangible assets. This difference is due to the fact that an
event of default may not result in the liquidation of the borrower’s assets. These
findings are consistent with our hypothesis that lenders require less restrictive
default clauses when the expected costs of triggering them are higher.
6 Conclusion
We investigate factors that drive the restrictiveness of default clauses, a common set
of provisions in debt contracts that allows lenders to request the repayment of debt
principal and to terminate lending commitments. Although default clauses provide
comprehensive contractual mechanisms that facilitate the allocation of control
rights to lenders when borrowers underperform, the literature on the characteristics
and determinants of these provisions is limited. We fill this gap by manually coding
and analyzing the definitions of events of default in a large sample of bond and loan
contracts issued by nonfinancial public firms in the United States.
We predict and find that lenders set less restrictive default clauses if they expect
high costs when events of default are triggered. We document that default clauses
are more restrictive in loan contracts than in bond contracts, consistent with the
higher renegotiation costs faced by bondholders in resolving default and their more
subordinated debt claims. We also find that two ex ante proxies for borrower-
specific bankruptcy costs, the level of capitalized intangible assets and research and
development expenditures at the time of debt contracting, are associated with less
restrictive default clauses, especially in bond contracts. Our evidence is consistent
with the interpretation that bondholders write default clauses to prevent defaults,
given that, relative to bank lenders, their default costs are typically higher.
Bondholders’ default costs are larger due to their conflicting incentives, inability to
coordinate efficiently, and the fact that their claims are typically not secured by
tangible asset collateral and are subordinate to banks’ claims.
Our evidence on the specification of bond and loan default clauses adds to the
debt contracting literature by highlighting that the design of contractual mechanisms
that facilitate the transfer of control rights to lenders is impacted by lenders’
expected costs when these mechanisms are used. Our findings complement prior
work on the contracting role of covenants by documenting the structure of the full
set of debt contractual mechanisms that provide control rights to lenders. We do not
investigate the extent to which the presence of these mechanisms and their
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contractual specification has subsequent consequences with respect to borrowers’
operational, financial, and investment activities and the value of lenders’ claims. We
leave these aspects to future research.
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Appendix 1: Descriptions of major default clauses
See Table 9.
Table 9 This appendix provides general descriptions and specific examples (extracted from sample
contracts) for all default clauses summarized in Table 1
Name Debt
contract
Description Examples (from debt contracts)
Bankruptcy
filing
Bonds
and
loans
The borrower’s filing for
bankruptcy, insolvency, or
reorganization
Events of bankruptcy, insolvency, or
reorganization
Principal
payment
Bonds
and
loans
The borrower’s failure to pay
the principal of a bond or
loan
Default in the payment of principal or
premium, if any, when due
Interest
payment
Bonds
and
loans
The borrower’s failure to pay
interest on a bond or loan
Failure to pay interest when due
Covenant
breach
Bonds
and
loans
The borrower’s violation of a
debt covenant
Default in the performance of, or breach of, any
other covenant or warranty contained in the
contract for the benefit of debt securities
Cross-default Bonds
and
loans
The borrower is required to
accelerate the payment of
the debt principal because
an event of default has
occurred with respect to
other debt instruments or the
payment of other debt
instruments’ principal has
been accelerated
Default for 10 days after notice as provided in
the contract, in respect of any other
indebtedness for borrowed money of the
company or any restricted subsidiary in
excess of $10,000,000 that has been declared
due and payable prior to maturity
Court order Bonds
and
loans
The borrower’s failure to meet
financial obligations from a
court order
A final judgment or judgments that exceed
$5,000,000 or more in the aggregate, for the
payment of money, having been entered by a
court or courts of competent jurisdiction
against the Company or any of its
subsidiaries and such judgment or judgments
are not satisfied, stayed, annulled or
rescinded within 60 days of being entered
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Table 9 continued
Name Debt
contract
Description Examples (from debt contracts)
Invalid
guarantees
Bonds
and
loans
The guarantees received by
the borrower from third
parties become invalid
Any of the guarantees cease to be in full force
and effect, or any of the guarantees are
declared to be null and void or invalid and
unenforceable, or any of the subsidiary
guarantors denies or disaffirms its liability
under its guarantees (other than by reason of
release of a subsidiary guarantor in
accordance with the terms of the Indenture)
Non-debt
liabilities
Bonds
and
loans
The borrower’s failure to meet
non-debt liabilities
Failure or refusal to pay when due any taxes,
assessments, insurance, claims, liens, or
encumbrances
Report of
fundamental
change
Bonds
and
loans
The borrower’s failure to
report fundamental changes
with respect to its activities
Failure to provide notice of the occurrence of a
merger, acquisition, sale and lease-back
transaction, share delisting, significant
change in the membership of the board etc. as
required by the contract
Sinking funds Bonds The borrower’s failure to
deposit cash into a sinking
fund as required in the bond
contract
Default in the deposit of any sinking fund
payment when due, which default continues
for 30 days
Redemption Bonds The borrower’s failure to
redeem the bond when
bondholders exercise the
redemption option
Default in the obligation to redeem the notes
after bondholders have exercised their option
to redeem
Conversion Bonds The borrower’s failure to meet
the conversion requirement
when bondholders exercise
the conversion option
Default in the obligation to deliver the
settlement amount on conversion of the notes,
together with cash in lieu thereof in respect of
any fractional shares, on conversion of any
notes, and such default continues for a period
of 5 days or more
Change in
control
Loans The acquisition of borrower’s
ownership above a certain
percentage by any person or
entity
Any change in control, in which the co-
administrative agents and the banks notify the
companywithin 30 days after first being notified
by the Company of the change in control that the
co-administrative agents and the banks do not
consent to the change in control
ERISA events Loans The failure to meet the
funding obligations under
the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act
(ERISA) of 1974
Any of the following events shall occur with
respect to anypension plan: (1) the institutionof
any steps by the company, any member of its
controlled group, or any other person to
terminate a pension plan if, as a result of such
termination, the company or any such member
could reasonably expect to be required to make
a contribution to such pension plan, or could
reasonably expect to incur a liability or
obligation to such pension plan in excess of
$75,000,000; or (2) a contribution failure
occurs with respect to any pension plan that
gives rise to a lien under Section 302(f) of
ERISA with respect to a liability or obligation
in excess of $75,000,000
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Appendix 2: Variable definitions
See Table 10.
Table 9 continued
Name Debt
contract
Description Examples (from debt contracts)
Pending
litigation
Loans The existence of pending
litigation against the
borrower that potentially has
a material effect
Notice given to the borrower by the agent or
any bank that, in the opinion of the agent or
such bank, any litigation or governmental
proceeding which has been instituted against
the borrower or any subsidiary will
reasonably be likely to have a material
adverse effect, and within 30 days after such
notice, (1) such litigation or proceeding is not
dismissed or (2) an opinion of the borrower’s
or the affected subsidiary’s trial counsel shall
not have been received by each Bank, in form
and substance satisfactory to each bank, that
the borrower or the affected subsidiary has a
meritorious position and will ultimately
prevail in the proceedings
Other clauses Bonds
and
loans
Other clauses that do not
appear in our pilot samples
of 100 bonds and 100 loans
Failure by any borrower to furnish financial
information when due or when requested, or
permit the inspection of its books or records
Loss of any required government approvals
and/or any governmental regulatory authority
institutes action which, in the opinion of
bank, will adversely affect the borrower’s
condition, operations, or ability to repay the
loan and/or line of credit
Uninsured Losses. Any loss, theft, damages, or
destruction of any material portion of the
collateral not fully covered (subject to such
deductibles as agent shall have permitted) by
insurance
Table 10 This appendix provides the definitions of all variables used in the analyses
Variable Definition
Bond Indicator variable equal to 1 if the contract is a bond contract and 0 if it is a loan
contract
Bond/loan
maturity
Difference between the issue date and the maturity date of the bond/loan
Bond/loan size The natural logarithm of the bond/loan amount
Capital market
access
Indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has a prior bond issue and 0
otherwise
Credit rating Numeric values assigned to firm/bond ratings offered by S&P’s or Moody’s, ranging
from 1 to 20 with the rating ‘‘AAA’’ equal to 1
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